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A Theory of Countercyclical Government Multiplier†
By Pascal Michaillat*
I develop a New Keynesian model in which a type of government 
multiplier doubles when unemployment rises from 5  percent to 
8 percent. This multiplier indicates the additional number of workers 
employed when one worker is hired in the public sector. Graphically, 
in equilibrium, an upward-sloping quasi-labor supply intersects a 
downward-sloping labor demand in a (employment, labor market 
tightness) plane. Increasing public employment stimulates labor 
demand, which increases tightness and therefore crowds out private 
employment. Critically, the quasi-labor supply is convex. Hence, 
when labor demand is depressed and unemployment is high, the 
increase in tightness and resulting crowding-out are small. (JEL 
E12, E24, E32, E62)
Arecent literature has argued that the effect of government policy can be different across stages of the business cycle if the zero lower bound on nominal interest 
rates is reached during a recession.1 In this paper, I present a New Keynesian model 
in which the effect of government policy varies across stages of the business cycle 
even when the zero lower bound does not bind.2 I consider a policy in which the 
government increases the size of the public-sector workforce. I measure the effect 
of this policy with the public-employment multiplier, defined as the additional num-
ber of workers employed when one more worker is employed in the public sector. 
I find that this multiplier doubles when the unemployment rate rises from 5 percent 
to 8 percent.
In the model, the effect of government policy varies over the business cycle 
because of the structure of the labor market, adapted from the search-and-matching 
framework of Michaillat (2012). Since government and firms hire from the same 
1 See for instance Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011) and Eggertsson and Krugman (2012).
2 Canzoneri et al. (2012) propose an alternative model in which the effect of government policy varies over the 
business cycle. Their model features costly financial intermediation and countercyclical financial frictions.
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pool of job seekers, increasing public employment crowds out private  employment. 
To increase  public employment, the government posts additional vacancies. 
Furthermore,  increasing  public employment mechanically reduces the number of 
job seekers. Therefore, increasing public employment raises labor market tight-
ness—the number of vacancies per jobseeker—and makes it more costly for firms 
to hire workers, thus reducing private employment. The government policy reduces 
unemployment more effectively in recession than in expansion because crowding-
out is weaker then. The extent of crowding-out is determined by the amplitude of 
this increase in labor market tightness. When unemployment is high, the govern-
ment needs few vacancies to hire additional workers because the matching process 
is congested by job seekers; moreover, the number of job seekers is so large that the 
vacancies posted and job seekers hired by the government have little influence on 
tightness. Consequently, the increase in tightness is small and crowding-out is weak. 
The same mechanism leads to strong crowding-out when unemployment is low and 
the matching process is congested by vacancies.
In Section I, I develop a simple search-and-matching model to highlight the key 
economic forces that drive the results. I do comparative steady-states exercises 
because they are transparent. They provide an analytical expression for the pub-
lic-employment multiplier and can be represented diagrammatically. Indeed, the 
steady-state equilibrium is the intersection of an upward sloping, convex quasi-
labor supply curve and a downward sloping aggregate labor demand curve in a 
(employment, labor market tightness) plane. The quasi-labor supply is the employ-
ment rate when labor market flows are balanced, and the aggregate labor demand 
is firms’ labor demand plus public employment. The properties of the curves arise 
from a standard matching function and a production function with diminishing 
marginal returns to labor. I first compare a steady state to another steady state with 
one more public worker. The difference in aggregate employment is the public-
employment multiplier. I find that the multiplier is between zero and one. In the 
diagram, the aggregate labor demand curve shifts outward when public employ-
ment is higher, leading to higher employment and higher tightness. Next, I compare 
a steady state to another steady state with a higher wage and thus higher unemploy-
ment. I find that the multiplier is higher when wage and unemployment are higher. 
In the diagram, the aggregate labor demand curve shifts inward when the wage is 
higher, and the convex quasi-labor supply curve is flatter at the equilibrium point. 
Thus, increasing public employment leads to a smaller increase in tightness and a 
larger increase in employment.
In Section II, I embed the search-and-matching model into a New Keynesian 
model. I simulate the responses to a range of technology shocks. Unemployment 
rises after negative shocks because the real wage is somewhat rigid. I compare the 
response of employment when the government hires additional public workers after 
the shock and when it does not. The resulting public-employment multiplier doubles 
from 0.24 to 0.49 when the unemployment rate rises from 5 percent to 8 percent.
The public-employment multiplier is a type of government-consumption multi-
plier in that it measures the macroeconomic effect of an increase in government con-
sumption. It is not the typical government-consumption multiplier, which measures 
the response of output to an increase in government purchases of goods from the 
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private sector. It is nonetheless relevant for policy.3 First, on average, from 1947 to 
2011 in the United States,  public employment represents 63 percent of government 
consumption, whereas purchases of goods from the private sector represent only 
37 percent.4 Second, public employment has been used to stimulate employment in 
recession, for instance during the Great Depression by the Roosevelt administration 
(Neumann, Fishback, and Kantor 2010).
In the model, hiring workers in the public sector is more effective when unemploy-
ment is higher. Furthermore, hiring public workers always reduces unemployment, 
whereas purchasing goods from the private sector has no effect on unemployment. 
These results suggest that empirical estimates of multipliers obtained by averag-
ing the effects of government spending over the business cycle may not apply in 
recession. Moreover, estimates obtained by averaging the effects of different types 
of government spending may not apply to a particular type of spending. Section III 
discusses such implications of the model and some of its shortcomings.
I. Comparative Steady-States Analysis of the Multiplier
This section builds a simple model that adds public employment to the search-
and-matching framework of Michaillat (2012).5 Comparative steady states show 
that the public-employment multiplier is always between 0 and 1, and that it is closer 
to 1 when the unemployment rate is higher. Section II complements these analytical 
results with numerical results obtained by simulating a temporary increase in public 
employment at different stages of the business cycle with a New Keynesian model.
A. A search-and-Matching Model
Labor Market.—A measure 1 of identical workers participate in a labor market 
composed of two sectors. The government employs  g t < 1 workers in the public sec-
tor. A measure 1 of identical firms employ  l t workers in the private sector. Aggregate 
employment is  n t =  l t +  g t . At the end of period t − 1, a fraction s of the  n t−1 existing 
worker-job matches is exogenously destroyed. Workers who lose their job start search-
ing for a new job immediately. At the beginning of period t,  u t = 1 − (1 − s) ·  n t−1 
unemployed workers search for a job. Job seekers apply to jobs randomly, without 
directing their search to the private or public sector. Job seekers who find a job start 
working in period t with the (1 − s) ·  n t−1 incumbent workers.
Firms and the government post a total of  v t vacancies to hire workers. The number of 
matches in period t is given by a Cobb-Douglas matching function:  h t = m ·  u t η ·  v t 1−η . 
3 Public employment has long been recognized as an important component of government consumption. See for 
instance Kahn (1931), Finn (1998), Cavallo (2005), and Pappa (2009).
4 In national accounts, government consumption is the cost of producing the services provided by the gov-
ernment, such as education or health care. Table 3.10.5 in the National Income and Product Accounts, titled 
“Government Consumption Expenditures and General Government Gross Output,” shows that 55 percent of these 
production costs are compensations of public employees, 33 percent are purchases of intermediate goods and ser-
vices from the private sector, and 12 percent accounts for consumption of government fixed capital, an inputed rent 
on capital from which I abstract.
5 For other search-and-matching models with public employment, see Quadrini and Trigari (2007), Gomes 
(2010), and Burdett (2012).
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The parameter m > 0 measures the effectiveness of matching, and η ∈ (0, 1) is the 
elasticity of the matching function with respect to unemployment. Let  θ t ≡  v t / u t be the 
labor market tightness. Job seekers find a job with probability f ( θ t ) =  h t / u t = m ·  θ t 1−η , 
and vacancies in both sectors are filled at the same rate q( θ t ) =  h t / v t = m ·  θ t −η .6
Large Household.—All workers belong to a large household that consumes a 
final good and a public good. The household’s time discount factor is β < 1. The 
final good is purchased from firms. The public good is provided free of charge by 
the government. The household finances its consumption of final good with its 
income. Employed workers receive a real wage  w t taxed at rate  τ t , unemployed 
workers receive no income, and firms distribute their real profits  T t to the house-
hold because it owns them. Hence, the household’s consumption of final good is 
 c t = (1 −  τ t ) ·  w t ·  n t +  T t .
Given the matching process on the labor market, the household’s employment rate is
(1)   n t = (1 − s) ·  n t−1 +  ( 1 − (1 − s)·  n t−1 ) · f ( θ t ).
In steady state, inflows to unemployment, s · n, equal outflows from unemploy-
ment,  [ 1 − (1 − s) · n ] · f (θ), and the employment rate is a function of labor mar-
ket tightness given by
(2)   n s (θ) =  f (θ)  __  
s + (1 − s) · f (θ) .
I refer to this function as quasi-labor supply. It translates the search decision 
of workers into the employment rate that prevails when the labor market is in 
steady state. Of course, in this model there is no active search decision: work-
ers’ search effort is exogenously set to 1. But it is easy to endogenize the search 
decision as a function of the flow values of work and unemployment. In that case, 
the quasi-labor supply incorporates the optimal search choice and translates it 
into a steady-state employment rate.7 The quasi-labor supply is therefore similar 
to a conventional labor supply in that it gives the quantity of labor arising from 
workers’ optimal choice based on prevailing economic conditions, especially the 
return of work relative to nonwork (leisure or job search). However, there is one 
difference between the two concepts of labor supply. A conventional labor supply 
indicates directly workers’ optimal employment choice (number of hours, or num-
ber of workers with indivisible labor). But in the presence of matching frictions, 
workers cannot directly choose how much they work; they can only choose how 
much they search for jobs when they are unemployed. Therefore, the quasi-labor 
supply indicates the steady-state employment rate that prevails when workers’ 
search choice is optimal.
6 Formally, the definition of the matching function includes the restriction that  h t ≤  u t , which leads to the restric-
tion that f ( θ t ) ≤ 1. I suppress these restrictions for notational convenience.
7 See Landais, Michaillat, and Saez (2010).
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Lemma 1 establishes a few properties of the quasi-labor supply:
LEMMA 1: The function  n s (θ) is strictly increasing, strictly concave, li m θ→+∞  n s (θ) = 1, and li m θ→0  n s (θ) = 0.
The proof follows from the properties of f (θ). The lemma says that when labor 
market flows are balanced and labor market tightness is high, employment is high. 
The reason is that job seekers find jobs quickly when tightness is high.
Firms.—Firms produce a final good and sell it on a perfectly competitive market. 
A representative firm uses labor  l t to produce output  y t according to the production 
function  y t =  l t α , where α ∈ (0, 1) measures diminishing marginal returns to labor.
The firm pays a real wage  w t to its employees. In addition, the firm incurs a cost 
to hire workers. In period t, the firm hires  l t − (1 − s) ·  l t−1 workers. Posting a 
vacancy for one period costs r units of final good, where r > 0 measures resources 
spent recruiting workers. I assume no randomness at the firm level: a firm hires a 
worker with certainty by opening 1/q( θ t ) vacancies and spending r/q( θ t ). Hence, 
the firm’s real profits in period t are
   l t α −  w t ·  l t −  r _ 
q( θ t ) ·  [ l t − (1 − s) ·  l t−1 ] .
Given  {  θ t } t=0 +∞ and  {  w t } t=0 +∞ , the firm chooses  {  l t } t=0 +∞ to maximize the discounted sum 
of real profits. In steady state, the optimal employment choice satisfies
(3)  α ·  l α−1 = w +  [ 1 − β · (1 − s) ] ·  r _ 
q(θ) .
The firm hires labor until the marginal product of labor, α ·  l α−1 , equals the mar-
ginal cost of labor, which is the sum of the real wage, w, plus the amortized hiring 
cost,  [ 1 − β · (1 − s) ] · r/q(θ). The firm’s labor demand is the employment level 
that solves (3), expressed as function of labor market tightness and real wage:
(4)   l d (θ, w) =  [ 1 _ α ·  { w +  [ 1 − β · (1 − s) ] ·  r _ q(θ) } ]  −1 _ 1−α  .
The aggregate labor demand is the sum of firms’ labor demand and public 
employment, expressed as a function of labor market tightness, real wage, and pub-
lic employment:
(5)   n d (θ, w, g) = g +  l  d (θ, w).
Lemma 2 establishes a few properties of the aggregate labor demand:
LEMMA  2: The function  n d (θ, w, g) is strictly decreasing in θ and w, 
li m θ→+∞  n d (θ, w, g) = g, and li m θ→0  n d (θ, w, g) =  n ∗ , where  n ∗ = g +  [ w/α ]  −1 _ 1−α  .
The proof follows from the properties of q(θ). The lemma says that firms’ 
desired employment is low when the real wage or labor market tightness are high. 
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The  reason is simple: when the real wage is high, the marginal cost of labor is high; 
and when tightness is high, the hiring cost is high, so the marginal cost of labor is 
high as well. The quantity min {1,  n ∗ } is the employment rate that prevails if the 
recruiting cost, r, is 0. If  n ∗ < 1, then the labor market does not converge to full 
employment when the recruiting cost converges to 0: jobs are rationed in the sense 
of Michaillat (2012). Here, jobs are rationed if w > α · (1 − g ) α−1 .
real Wage.—As in Hall (2005), I assume that the real wage  w t is exogenous. 
Assuming an exogenous real wage is one way to resolve the indeterminacy of 
wages that arise in search-and-matching models, because worker and firm deter-
mine the wage in a situation of bilateral monopoly.8 This situation arises because 
worker and firm must share a positive surplus, created by their matching. The pos-
itive surplus arises because the firm’s marginal product of labor always exceeds 
the worker’s flow value of unemployment when they match. In the steady-state 
equilibrium, firms’ hiring decisions impose that the real wage falls between the 
marginal product of labor and the flow value of unemployment; therefore, the real 
wage is necessarily pairwise Pareto efficient.
Government.—The government employs  g t workers that produce a public good 
z t according to the production function  z t = σ ·  g t α , where σ > 0 scales the pro-
ductivity of the government relative to that of firms. The government balances its 
budget each period. Government expenditures are the compensations of public 
workers paid at the private sector wage,  g t ·  w t , and the cost incurred by hiring 
public workers, [ g t − (1 − s) ·  g t−1 ] · r/q( θ t ). To finance the expenditures, the 
government levies a labor tax that yields  τ t ·  w t ·  n t .
B. steady-state Equilibrium
This section solves for the steady-state equilibrium of the model, taking as given 
the values w and g of the real wage and public employment. The equilibrium con-
sists of two endogenous variables, aggregate employment n, and labor market tight-
ness θ. Equilibrium labor market tightness equalizes quasi-labor supply to aggregate 
labor demand:
(6)   n s (θ) =  n d (θ, w, g).
Equilibrium employment is obtained from the aggregate labor demand:
(7)  n =  n d (θ, w, g),
8 The indeterminacy of the wage in a situation of bilateral monopoly was first highlighted by Edgeworth (1881) 
and was discussed by Howitt and McAfee (1987), Pissarides (1989), and Hall (2005) in the context of search-
and-matching models. Since the work of Diamond (1982) and Mortensen (1982), the common way to resolve the 
indeterminacy in search-and-matching models is to set the wage using the Nash bargaining solution.
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where θ satisfies (6). Lemmas 1 and 2 imply that the equilibrium exists and is unique. 
Figure 1A depicts the equilibrium in a (n, θ) plane.9 The quasi-labor supply curve 
is upward sloping and convex. The aggregate labor demand curve is downward 
 sloping. The aggregate labor demand curve intersects the x-axis at  n ∗ . Quasi-labor 
supply curve and aggregate labor demand curve intersect at the equilibrium point.
Equilibrium is reached through posting of vacancies. Imagine that aggregate labor 
demand is greater than quasi-labor supply. Then, firms and government post addi-
tional vacancies to hire more workers. On the one hand, more job seekers find a job. 
On the other hand, the vacancy-filling rate falls such that the hiring cost rises and 
the number of workers desired by firms falls. As a result, the gap between demand 
and supply diminishes. Firms and government post more and more vacancies until 
the gap between demand and supply is completely closed.
9 Landais, Michaillat, and Saez (2010) introduced this representation to study optimal unemployment insurance.
Figure 1. Steady-State Equilibria in the Search-and-Matching Model
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C. Low-unemployment and High-unemployment steady states
This section studies steady-state equilibria that differ by the value w of the real 
wage. This comparative steady-states exercise is useful because in the context of 
business cycles generated by a combination of technology shocks and real wage 
rigidity (as in Section II), the key difference between expansions and recessions cor-
responds to a difference in w. To simplify the derivations, I assume that a change in 
the value w of the real wage is mechanically accompanied by a change in the value 
g of public employment. More precisely, I assume that across steady-state equilibria 
parameterized by different w, the ratio of public employment to private employment 
is constant: g/l = ζ, where ζ > 0 is a parameter.10
Lemma 3 establishes how the labor market changes across steady-state equilibria 
parameterized by different w :
LEMMA 3: The labor market variables satisfy dθ/dw < 0, dl/dw < 0, dn/dw < 0, 
and du/dw > 0.
The lemma says that in a steady state in which the real wage is high, labor mar-
ket tightness, private employment, and aggregate employment are low, and unem-
ployment is high. Appendix A contains the proof of the lemma, but the main idea 
can be seen graphically by comparing the steady state with high wage depicted 
in Figure  1B to the steady state with low wage depicted in Figure  1A. In the 
high-wage steady state, the aggregate labor demand is depressed. Accordingly, 
the aggregate labor demand curve is located inward. Hence, in equilibrium, labor 
market tightness and employment are low, and unemployment is high. The high-
wage steady state mimics a recession, and conversely, the low-wage steady state 
mimics an expansion.
D. Public-Employment Multiplier
In this section, I take the economy in a steady state, increase the value g of public 
employment, compute the new steady state, and compare employment in the two 
steady states. Then, I study how the change in employment depends on the value w 
of the real wage in the initial steady state.
I measure the difference in employment between the two steady states by a 
multiplier:
DEFINITION 1: The public-employment multiplier λ is the additional number of 
workers employed when one additional worker is employed in the public sector:
  λ ≡  ∂n _∂g  .
10 This assumption is perhaps unrealistic, and I will relax it in the simulations in Section II.
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Proposition 1 establishes some properties of the public-employment multiplier:
PROPOSITION 1: The public-employment multiplier λ satisfies three properties: 
 (i) λ < 1; 
 (ii) λ > 0; and 
 (iii) dλ/dw > 0.
Part (i) shows that the multiplier is less than 1. In other words, increasing public 
employment necessarily crowds out private employment. This result is illustrated 
in Figures 1C and 1D. After an increase in public employment, the aggregate labor 
demand curve shifts outward. At the current tightness, the quasi-labor supply falls 
short of the aggregate labor demand. To reach a new equilibrium, tightness increases. 
Thus, the vacancy-filling rate falls and the hiring cost rises. As a consequence, firms 
reduce employment.
Part (ii) shows that the multiplier is positive. In other words, increasing public 
employment crowds out private employment strictly less than one-for-one, and it 
necessarily stimulates aggregate employment. If crowding-out were one-for-one, 
the new equilibrium would have the same labor market tightness but lower private 
employment. The marginal cost of labor would be the same, but the marginal prod-
uct of labor would be higher by diminishing marginal returns to labor; therefore, the 
firm’s optimal employment choice would be violated. To conclude, crowding-out is 
strictly less than one-for-one.
Part (iii) shows that the multiplier is higher in steady states in which the real wage is 
higher. In other words, in steady states in which the aggregate labor demand is weaker 
and unemployment is higher, crowding-out is weaker, and increasing public employ-
ment reduces unemployment more effectively. This result is illustrated by comparing 
the high-wage steady state in Figure 1D to the low-wage steady state in Figure 1C. In 
the high-wage steady-state, the quasi-labor supply is flat at the equilibrium point. Thus, 
a shift in the aggregate labor demand curve following an increase in public employ-
ment leads to a small increase in tightness and a large increase in employment. That 
is, crowding-out is weak and the multiplier is large. On the contrary, in the low-wage 
steady-state, the quasi-labor supply is steep at the equilibrium point. Thus, the shift 
in the aggregate labor demand curve leads to a large increase in tightness and a small 
increase in employment. That is, crowding-out is strong and the multiplier is small.
Part (iii) can also be explained by thinking directly about vacancies and the 
matching process. To increase public employment, the government posts addi-
tional vacancies. Furthermore, increasing public employment mechanically reduces 
the number of job seekers. Therefore, increasing public employment raises labor 
market tightness—the number of vacancies per jobseeker. The extent of crowd-
ing-out is determined by the amplitude of this increase in labor market tightness. 
When  unemployment is high, the government needs few vacancies to hire additional 
workers because the matching process is congested by job seekers; moreover, the 
number of job seekers is so large that the vacancies posted and job seekers hired 
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by the government have little influence on tightness. Consequently, the increase in 
tightness is small and crowding-out is weak. On the contrary, when unemployment 
is low, the government needs many vacancies to hire additional workers because the 
matching process is congested by vacancies; moreover, the number of job seekers is 
small such that the vacancies posted and job seekers hired by the government have 
a large influence on tightness. Consequently, the increase in tightness is large and 
crowding-out is strong.
The complete proof of the proposition is relegated to Appendix A, but I provide 
a sketch here. Let  ϵ s ≡ (θ/ n s ) · (∂ n s /∂ θ) > 0 and  ϵ d ≡ −(θ/ n d ) · (∂ n d /∂θ) > 0 be 
the elasticities of quasi-labor supply and aggregate labor demand with respect to 
tightness. (The elasticities are normalized to be positive.) Implicit differentiation of 
equations (6) and (7) yields
(8)  λ = 1 −  1 _ 
1+ ( ϵ   s / ϵ   d )  .
The increase in aggregate employment equals the increase in public employment 
attenuated by a factor 1/[1+ ( ϵ   s / ϵ   d ) ]. This factor measures the crowding-out of 
private  employment. The proof shows that λ ∈ (0, 1) because both  ϵ  s and  ϵ  d are 
positive and finite. The proof also shows that  ϵ  s is proportional to unemployment 
and  ϵ  d is proportional to the share of the hiring cost in the marginal cost of labor. 
Since this share decreases with unemployment, both  ϵ  s / ϵ  d and λ are larger when 
unemployment is higher.
Matching frictions and diminishing marginal returns to labor are critical for the 
results in Proposition 1. Without matching frictions, the multiplier would be 1 in any 
steady state. For instance, imagine that there is no recruiting cost (r = 0). Then the 
aggregate labor demand does not depend on θ. In Figures 1C and 1D, the aggregate 
labor demand curve is vertical. There is no crowding-out. As a result, the multiplier 
is 1. Formally, the aggregate labor demand is inelastic, so  ϵ   d = 0, crowding-out is 
1/[1+ ( ϵ   s / ϵ   d ) ] = 0, and λ = 1.
With constant returns to labor instead of diminishing marginal returns, the mul-
tiplier would be zero in any steady state. With constant returns to labor (α = 1), 
the firm’s optimal employment choice solely determines equilibrium tightness. 
Combined with the quasi-labor supply, equilibrium tightness determines equilib-
rium employment independent of public employment. Since aggregate employment 
is independent of public employment, an increase in public employment must be 
offset by a commensurate decrease in private employment. As a result, the multiplier 
is zero. Formally, the aggregate labor demand is perfectly elastic, so  ϵ  d = +∞, 
crowding-out is 1/[1+ ( ϵ   s / ϵ   d ) ] = 1, and λ = 0.
To conclude, I connect the results in Proposition 1 to the results in Michaillat 
(2012). These sets of results are distinct even though they rely on the same 
ingredients—variations in real wage and diminishing marginal returns to labor. 
Proposition 4 in Michaillat (2012) establishes a property of the model based on its 
behavior at the limit where matching frictions vanish. It shows that when the real 
wage is high enough, the labor market does not converge to full employment when 
the recruiting cost converges to 0. Figure 1B illustrates the property. The aggregate 
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labor demand intersects the x-axis below 1; thus, it is not profitable for firms to hire 
all the workers even when recruiting is costless—jobs are rationed. On the other 
hand, Proposition 1 in this paper establishes a property of the model based on the 
behavior of the slope of the quasi-labor supply, measured by  ϵ  s , relative to the slope 
of the aggregate labor demand, measured by  ϵ  d . The behavior of  ϵ  s / ϵ  d determines 
the behavior of the public-employment multiplier.
II. Multiplier Dynamics
This section uses simulations to explore the effect of a temporary increase in 
public employment at different stages of the business cycle. To improve realism, 
the search-and-matching model of the previous section is embedded into a New 
Keynesian model. Simulations of this model calibrated to US data confirm the com-
parative steady-states results—the public-employment multiplier is positive and 
countercyclical.
A. A New Keynesian Model
overview.—This model embeds the search-and-matching model of Section I. 
Therefore, the model presents three departures from the textbook New Keynesian 
model. First, since government consumption arises not from purchases of goods 
from the private sector but from compensations of public employees, govern-
ment consumption appears not in the resource constraint but in the aggregate labor 
demand. Second, monopolistic firms are subject not to the price-setting friction 
of Calvo (1983) but to the quadratic price adjustment cost of Rotemberg (1982); 
therefore, the Phillips curve admits a different expression. I introduce a quadratic 
price-adjustment cost because it yields a closed-form expression for the Phillips 
curve, which simplifies the simulations.11 Third, the labor market is not perfectly 
competitive but adopts a search-and-matching structure.12 This departure introduces 
four modifications to the model. First, the labor supply is replaced by the quasi-
labor supply. Second, firms’ labor demand accounts for hiring cost. Third, the model 
counts one more variable, labor market tightness, determined by the equality of 
quasi-labor supply and aggregate labor demand. Fourth, the model counts one more 
equation, a rule that shares the surplus arising from each worker-firm match and thus 
determines the real wage.
shock.—Business cycles are driven by technology, modeled as a stochastic 
 process  {  a t } t=0 +∞ .
11 Braun, Körber, and Waki (2012) also take advantage of the simplicity brought by this price adjustment cost 
to compute the equilibrium of a nonlinear model of the zero lower bound. For other New Keynesian models using 
this price adjustment cost, see Hairault and Portier (1993), Chéron and Langot (2000), and Krause, Lopez-Salido, 
and Lubik (2008).
12 Several New Keynesian models add matching frictions to the labor market. See Galí (2010) for an overview.
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Labor Market.—The private sector is now composed of a continuum of interme-
diate-good firms indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. Firm i employs  l t (i) workers. Private employ-
ment is  l t =  ∫ 0 1  l t (i) di.
Large Household.—The large household has expected utility
(9)   피 0  ∑ 
t=0
+∞
 β  t ·  [ ln( c t ) + χ · ln( z t ) ] ,
where  피 0 is the expectation conditional on period-0 information, and χ measures the 
taste for public good. Workers pool their income before choosing consumption and 
saving.13 The household’s budget constraint becomes
(10)  p t ·  c t +  b t =  p t ·  n t · (1 −  τ t ) ·  w t +  r t−1 ·  b t−1 +  p t ·  T t ,
where  p t is the price level,  b t is the quantity of one-period bonds purchased at time t, 
and  r t−1 is the one-period gross nominal interest rate that pays off in period t. The 
household chooses consumption  {  c t } t=0 +∞ to maximize (9) subject to (10) and the 
no- Ponzi-game constraint
   피 0  [  lim  t→+∞   b t  _  ∏ i=0 t  r i−1  ] ≥ 0.
Let  π t ≡  ( p t / p t−1 ) − 1 be the inflation rate at time t. The household’s optimal 
consumption path is governed by the Euler equation
(11)  1 = β ·  피 t   [   r t  _ 1 +  π t+1  ·   c t  _  c t+1  ] .
Final-Good Firms. —A measure one of identical firms produce the final good and 
sell it on a perfectly competitive market. The representative final-good firm uses 
 y t (i) units of each intermediate good i ∈  [ 0, 1 ] to produce  y t units of final good using 
the production function
   y t =  [  ∫ 0 1  y t (i ) (ϵ −1)/ϵ  di ] ϵ /(ϵ −1) ,
where ϵ  > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across intermediate goods.
The final-good firm takes as given the nominal price  p t (i) of each intermediate 
good i ∈  [ 0, 1 ] and the nominal price  p t of the final good. The firm chooses  y t (i) for 
all i ∈  [ 0, 1 ] to maximize its profits
   p t ·  [  ∫ 0 1  y t (i ) (ϵ −1)/ϵ  di ] ϵ /(ϵ −1) −  ∫ 0 1  p t (i) ·  y t (i) di. 
13 This formulation is standard since Merz (1995). It avoids the complications that would arise if workers had 
heterogeneous wealth levels that depended on their employment histories.
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The first-order condition with respect to  y t (i) is
(12)   y t (i) =  y t ·  (  p t (i) _ p t   ) −ϵ  .
This equation describes the demand for intermediate good i as a function of the rela-
tive price  p t (i)/ p t .
Perfect competition in the final-good market requires that the price of the final 
good equals its marginal cost of production:
   p t =  ( ∫ 0 1  p t (i ) 1−ϵ  di ) 1/(1−ϵ ) .
Intermediate-Good Firms.—There is no entry or exit into the production of 
intermediate goods. Intermediate good i ∈  [ 0, 1 ] is produced by a monopolist. The 
monopolist uses  l t (i) units of labor to produce  y t (i) units of intermediate good i 
according to the production function
(13)   y t (i) =  a t ·  l t (i ) α ,
where  a t is the state of technology and α ∈ (0, 1) measures diminishing marginal 
returns to labor.
As in Rotemberg (1982), the monopolist incurs a cost to adjust its nominal price 
given by
   
ϕ _ 
2
·  (  p t (i) _  p t−1 (i) − 1 ) 2 ·  c t ,
where ϕ > 0 captures resources devoted to adjusting prices. The price-adjustment 
cost is measured in units of final good, and it increases proportionally with the 
size of the economy, measured by consumption  c t . The monopolist also incurs 
a cost r ·  a t to post a vacancy for one period; therefore, it incurs a total cost 
 [  l t (i) − (1 − s) ·  l t−1 (i) ] · r ·  a t /q( θ t ) to hire new workers in period t. The hiring 
cost is measured in units of final good, and it increases proportionally with the state 
of technology  a t .
The monopolist chooses { l t (i) } t=0 +∞ and {  p t (i) } t=0 +∞ , and to maximize the expected 
sum of discounted real profits
  피 0  ∑ 
t=0
+∞
 
 β  t 
 _ c t   ·  {   p t (i) _ p t   ·  y t (i) −  w t ·  l t (i)
  −   ϕ _ 
2
·  (  p t (i) _  p t−1 (i) − 1 ) 2 ·  c t   −    r ·  a t  _q( θ t ) ·  [ l t (i)  −  (1 − s) l t−1 (i) ]  } 
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subject to (12) and (13). The discount factor  β  t / c t indicates the value of one unit 
of final good in period t from the perspective of the household in time 0. The 
Lagrangian is
  피 0  ∑ 
t=0
+∞
 
 β  t 
 _ c t   ·  {  (  p t (i) _ p t   ) 1−ϵ  ·  y t −  w t ·  l t (i) −  ϕ _ 2 ·  (  p t (i) _  p t−1 (i) − 1 ) 2 ·  c t 
  −  r ·  a t  _
q( θ t )  ·  [ l t (i) − (1 − s) ·  l t−1 (i) ] 
  +  Λ t (i) ·  [ a t ·  l t (i ) α −  (  p t (i) _ p t   ) −ϵ  ·  y t ] } ,
where  Λ t (i) is the Lagrange multiplier on constraint (13) in period t. The multiplier Λ t (i) is the real marginal revenue of producing one unit of intermediate good i in 
period t. The first-order condition with respect to  l t (i) is
(14)   Λ t (i) · α ·  l t (i ) α−1 
   =   w t  _ a t   +  
r _ 
q( θ t ) − β · (1 − s) ·  피 t  [   c t  _  c t+1  ·   a t+1  _ a t   ·  r _ q( θ t+1 ) ] .
The first-order condition with respect to  p t (i) is
(15)   p t (i) _ p t   =  
ϵ  _ ϵ − 1 ·  Λ t (i) +  
ϕ _ ϵ − 1 ·  
 c t  _ y t  ·  (  p t (i) _ p t   ) ϵ  
  ·  [ β ·  피 t  [  (  p t+1 (i) _ p t (i) − 1 ) ·   p t+1 (i) _ p t (i) ] −  (  p t (i) _  p t−1 (i) − 1 ) ·   p t (i) _  p t−1 (i) ] .
real Wage.—As in Blanchard and Galí (2010), the real wage is a simple function 
of technology:
(16)   w t = ω ·  a t γ , 
where ω governs the level of the real wage and γ governs its response to tech-
nology. Below, I discuss microeconometric estimates of γ obtained in US data. 
They  indicate that γ < 1. In other words, the real wage is somewhat rigid in that it 
does not respond one-for-one to technology. This rigidity may be explained by the 
existence of several barriers that slow down the adjustment of wages to changes in 
productivity. A first barrier is the organization of firms around internal labor markets 
that tie wages to job descriptions.14 Another barrier is the common practice of not 
14 For an historical account of the evolution of firms’ organization, see Jacoby (1984). For descriptions of inter-
nal labor markets, see Doeringer and Piore (1971) and Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994).
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cutting wages. Managers are reluctant to cut wages because they think that wage 
cuts antagonize workers and thus reduce profitability.15
Monetary Policy. —Monetary policy sets the gross nominal interest rate to
(17)   r t =  1 _ β · (1 +  π t ) 
 μ π · (1− μ r ) · (β ·  r t−1 )  μ r  ,
where  π t is the inflation rate at time t,  μ r ∈ [0, 1) measures interest-rate smoothing, 
and  μ π > 1 measures the response of monetary policy to inflation. I assume that 
steady-state inflation is zero. The steady-state gross nominal interest rate is 1/β.
Government’s Budget Constraint and resource Constraint.—Each period, the 
government services the debt inherited from the previous period, which costs 
r t−1 ·  b t−1 , and it issues new debt, which brings  b t . Therefore, the budget constraint 
becomes
   n t ·  τ t ·  w t +   b t  _  p t =  g t ·  w t +  
r ·  a t  _
q( θ t )  ·  [ g t − (1 − s) ·  g t−1 ] +  
 r t−1  _ p t   ·  b t−1 .
Using the household’s budget constraint and the definition of profits, I rewrite the 
government’s budget constraint as the resource constraint
(18)  y t =  c t ·  ( 1 +  ϕ _ 2 ·  π t 2 ) +  r ·  a t  _q( θ t )  ·  [ n t − (1 − s) ·  n t−1 ] .
The resource constraint says that the final good is consumed or allocated to chang-
ing prices or allocated to hiring workers.
symmetric Equilibrium.—In a symmetric equilibrium, all intermediate good 
firms are identical. For all i ∈ [0, 1],  l t (i) =  l t ,  y t (i) =  y t , and  p t (i) =  p t . Let  Λ t be 
the real marginal revenue of producing one unit of intermediate good. Given  initial 
employment  n −1 , initial bond holding  b −1 , and stochastic processes { a t ,  g t } t=0 +∞ , a 
symmetric equilibrium is a collection of ten stochastic processes { w t ,  θ t ,  n t ,  l t ,  Λ t ,  π t ,  c t ,  y t ,  r t ,  b t } t=0 +∞ that satisfy ten relationships: the wage schedule, given by (16); the 
quasi-labor supply, given by (1); the aggregate labor demand,  n t =  l t +  g t ; firms’ 
labor demand, deriving from (14) and given by
(19)  Λ t · α  l t α−1 =   w t  _ a t   +  
r _ 
q( θ t ) − β · (1 − s) ·  피 t  [   c t  _  c t+1  ·   a t+1  _ a t   ·  r _ q( θ t+1 ) ] ;
the Phillips curve, deriving from (15) and given by
  π t · ( π t + 1) =  1 _ ϕ ·  
 y t  _ c t  ·  [ ϵ  ·  Λ t − (ϵ − 1) ] + β ·  피 t  [  π t+1 · ( π t+1 + 1) ] ;
15 For surveys of managers about wage-setting practices, see Campbell and Kamlani (1997) and especially 
Bewley (1999). For empirical evidence that wage cuts reduce productivity, see Mas (2006).
Vol. 6 No. 1 205Michaillat: a theory of countercyclical GovernMent Multiplier
the household’s budget constraint, given by (10); the Euler equation, given by (11); 
the monetary policy rule, given by (17); the production function,  y t =  a t ·  l t α ; and 
the resource constraint, given by (18).
The zero-inflation steady state of the New Keynesian model is isomorphic to 
the steady state studied in Section I. The steady state of the New Keynesian model 
is indeed given by the intersection of a quasi-labor supply and an aggregate labor 
demand, the sum of firms’ labor demand, and public employment. The quasi-labor 
supply remains given by (2). With zero inflation, the Phillips curve implies that 
Λ = (ϵ  − 1)/ϵ . Hence, firms’ labor demand satisfies (4) except for two changes: 
the marginal cost of labor is multiplied by a markup 1/Λ = ϵ/(ϵ − 1) > 1 because 
intermediate-good firms have some monopoly power; and the real wage is replaced 
by the ratio w/a because marginal product of labor and hiring cost are proportional 
to technology a. With some wage rigidity (γ < 1), w/a = ω ·  a γ−1 increases when 
technology falls; therefore, a steady state with low technology corresponds to a 
steady state with high real wage from Section I.
B. Calibration
I calibrate the New Keynesian model to US data. I take one period to be one 
week. Table 1 summarizes the calibration of all the parameters.
I calibrate a few parameters using conventional values. I set the production func-
tion parameter to α = 0.66; the elasticity of substitution across intermediate goods 
Table 1—Calibration of the New Keynesian Model (Weekly Frequency)
Description Value Source
Panel A. Steady-state targets
 
_ a Technology 1 Normalization
 
_ u Unemployment 0.064 JOLTS 2001–2011
 
_ θ Labor market tightness 0.43 JOLTS and CPS 2001–2011
 
_ g / _ n Share of public employment in total employment 0.167 CES 2001–2011
Panel B. Parameters
η Elasticity of matching function to unemployment 0.7 Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001)
r Recruiting cost 0.21 Barron, Berger, and Black (1997); Silva 
and Toledo (2009) 
s Job-destruction rate 0.009 JOLTS 2001–2011
γ Elasticity of real wage to technology 0.5 Pissarides (2009); Haefke, Sonntag,  
and van Rens (2008) 
 μ π Elasticity of monetary rule to inflation 1.5 Convention
 μ R Elasticity of monetary rule to lag interest rate 0.962 Yields a quarterly elasticity of 0.6 
ϕ Price-adjustment cost 61 Zbaracki et al. (2004)
ρ Autocorrelation of technology 0.992 MSPC 1947–2011
α Marginal returns to labor 0.66 Convention
β Discount factor 0.999 Yields an annual interest rate of 5 percent
ϵ Elasticity of substitution across goods 11 Yields a monopolistic markup of 1.1
m Matching effectiveness 0.17 Matches steady-state targets
ω Real-wage level 0.64 Matches steady-state targets
07_MAC20120220_61.indd   205 12/9/13   10:47 AM
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to ϵ  = 11, which yields a monopolistic markup of 1.1; and the discount factor to 
β = 0.999, which yields an annual interest rate of 5 percent.
Next, I calibrate the labor market parameters. I set the elasticity of the matching 
function with respect to unemployment at η = 0.7, in line with empirical evidence 
(Petrongolo and Pissarides 2001). As Michaillat (2012), I set the recruiting cost to 
r = 0.32 · ω, where ω is the steady-state real wage. This estimate is constructed 
from microevidence collected by Barron, Berger, and Black (1997) and Silva and 
Toledo (2009). I estimate the job destruction rate from the average of the season-
ally adjusted monthly total separation rate in all nonfarm industries constructed by 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) from the Job Openings and Labor Turnover 
Survey (JOLTS). All nonfarm industries include the nonfarm private sector and the 
government sector (federal, state, and local government). The monthly separation 
rate averages 0.036 from 2001 to 2011, so I set the weekly job destruction rate 
to s = 0.036/4 = 0.009. I calibrate the elasticity of the real wage with respect to 
technology from microeconometric estimates of the elasticity for wages in newly 
created jobs—the elasticity that matters for job creations (Pissarides 2009). In panel 
data following production and supervisory workers from 1984 to 2006, Haefke, 
Sonntag, and van Rens (2008) find an elasticity of total earnings of job movers with 
respect to productivity of 0.7.16 If the composition of the jobs accepted by workers 
improves in expansion, 0.7 is an upper bound on the elasticity of wages in newly 
created jobs (Gertler and Trigari 2009). A lower bound is the elasticity of wages 
in existing jobs, estimated between 0.1 and 0.45 (Pissarides 2009). Hence, I set 
γ = 0.5, in the range of plausible values. Since γ < 1, the real wage is somewhat 
rigid. In the simulations, I ensure that wage rigidity never cause the destruction of 
existing worker-firm matches.17
I then calibrate the monetary parameters. I set the parameters of monetary policy 
to  μ π = 1.5 and  μ r = 0.962, corresponding to 0.6 at quarterly frequency. These val-
ues are standard. I calibrate the price-adjustment cost from microevidence collected 
by. Using time-and-motion methods, they study the pricing process of a large indus-
trial firm. They find that the physical, managerial, and customer costs of changing 
prices amount to 1.22 percent of the firm’s revenue in a given year. The firm changed 
the price of 25 percent of its products that year, and most prices changed by about 
4 percent, so I set ϕ = 61.18
I assume that log technology follows an AR(1) process: log( a t+1 ) = ρ · log( a t ) +  ν t+1 , where the error term  ν t+1 is a centered normal random variable. I construct log 
technology as a residual log( a t ) = log( y t ) − α · log( l t ), where  y t and  l t are season-
ally adjusted quarterly real output and employment in the nonfarm business sector 
for the 1947–2011 period, constructed by the BLS Major Sector Productivity and 
Costs (MSPC) program. To isolate fluctuations at business cycle frequency, I take the 
difference between log technology and a low frequency trend—a  Hodrick-Prescott 
16 See table 6, panel A, column 4 in Haefke, Sonntag, and van Rens (2008).
17 Thus, wages are always pairwise Pareto efficient, and this wage rigidity is immune to the critique of Barro (1977).
18 To obtain ϕ, I solve ϕ/2 · (0.04 ) 2 · 0.25 = 0.0122. The value ϕ = 61 is similar to the maximum-likelihood 
estimate obtained by with a New Keynesian model.
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filter with smoothing parameter 1 0 5 . I estimate a quarterly autocorrelation of 0.897, 
so I set the weekly autocorrelation to ρ = 0.992.
To calibrate the remaining parameters, I set the steady-state value of some vari-
ables to the average of their empirical counterpart. Let   
_ x be the steady-state value of x. 
I normalize steady-state technology to  
_ a = 1. I compute labor market tightness as the 
ratio of the seasonally adjusted monthly vacancy level constructed by the BLS from 
the JOLTS to the seasonally adjusted monthly unemployment level constructed by 
the BLS from the Current Population Survey (CPS). Taking the average from 2001 to 
2011, I set  
_ θ = 0.43. Similarly, I set  _ u = 0.064, which implies  _ n = (1 −  _ u )/(1 − s) 
= 0.945. I compute the share of public employment in total employment using sea-
sonally adjusted monthly data from the BLS Current Employment Survey (CES). 
Public employment is employment in the government supersector, including federal, 
state, and local government. Total employment is the sum of public employment and 
employment in the total private supersector. The share of public employment aver-
aged 16.7  percent from 2001 to 2011, which implies that  
_ g = 0.167 ·  _ n = 0.157 and 
 
_ l =  _ n −  _ g = 0.788. I calibrate the matching effectiveness from the equality 
of unemployment inflows and outflows in steady state: m = s ·  _ n ·  _ θη−1 / _ u = 0.17. 
I calibrate the real-wage level from the optimal employment choice (19): 
ω = [(ϵ  − 1)/ϵ ] · α ·  _ l α−1 /{1 + [1 − β · (1 − s)] · 0.32/q( _ θ)} = 0.64. I recover 
r = 0.32 · ω = 0.21.
C. simulations
Using a shooting algorithm, I simulate an approximation of the calibrated New 
Keynesian model in which firms and workers have perfect foresight. Since the aim 
of the simulations is to quantify the nonlinearity of the model once the economy 
departs from its steady state, I cannot follow the standard procedure of simulating 
the log-linear approximation of the model.
I begin by simulating an expansion. At time 0, the economy is in steady state. 
At time 1, an unexpected positive technology shock ν = +0.054 occurs. After 
that, no other shock occurs and technology converges back to its steady-state 
value. Let   xt be the value of variable x at time t. For all t ≥ 1, log(  at ) =  ρ t−1 ·  ν 1 . 
Public employment remains constant over time:   gt =  _ g for all t ≥ 1, where  _ g is 
steady-state public employment. The government maintains public employment 
constant by hiring s ·  _ g workers each period. Under perfect foresight, workers and 
firms do not face any uncertainty: they perfectly anticipate the time path of all 
relevant variables after time 1.
The solid lines in Figure 2 are the responses to the positive technology shock. 
At time 1, technology increases, but the real wage increases only partially 
because of wage rigidity. Relative to technology, the marginal cost of labor falls. 
In response, firms post more vacancies to hire more workers. Thus, labor market 
tightness increases, and private employment builds up and peaks after 20 weeks. 
Consequently, unemployment drops and bottoms at 5.0  percent after 20 weeks. 
I also plot the response of the gross domestic product (GDP). As in national accounts, 
I define GDP as output of final good plus government consumption: GDP is 
 y t +  w t ·  g t + [ g t − (1 − s) ·  g t−1 ] · r ·  a t /q( θ t ). At time 1, GDP mechanically 
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increases because technology and thus output increase. GDP further increases in the 
next 10 weeks because private employment and thus output increase.
To quantify the effect of an increase in public employment during an expansion, 
I simulate the model when at time 1, the unexpected positive technology shock is 
accompanied by the unexpected hiring of 0.5 percent of the labor force in the pub-
lic sector. Let  x t ∗ be the value of variable x at time t. At time 1,  g 1 ∗ =   g1 + 0.005. 
After that, the government hires as many workers as in the previous simulation: 
g t * − (1 − s) ·  g t−1 ∗ = s ·  _ g for all t ≥ 2. Under perfect foresight, workers and firms 
perfectly anticipate the time path of public employment after time 1.
The dashed lines in Figure 2 are the responses to the positive technology shock 
accompanied by the increase in public employment. At time 1, the government posts 
more vacancies to hire additional workers in the public sector. As a result, public 
employment and labor market tightness rise above their previous level. Because 
labor market tightness increases, it is more costly for intermediate-good firms to 
recruit workers. Thus, the marginal cost of labor rises, firms reduce hiring, and 
 private employment falls below its previous level. In other words, public employ-
ment crowds out private employment. Nonetheless, the net effect of an increase in 
public employment is positive because unemployment falls below its previous level.
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Figure 2. Responses to a Positive Technology Shock
Notes: The solid lines are the responses to an unexpected positive technology shock of +5.4 percent. The dashed 
lines are the responses to an unexpected positive technology shock of +5.4 percent accompanied by the unexpected 
hiring of 0.5 percent of the labor force in the public sector. The responses are obtained by simulating an approxima-
tion of the calibrated New Keynesian model in which firms and workers have perfect foresight.
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To quantify the effect of an increase in public employment during a recession, I 
repeat the two previous simulations but replace the unexpected positive technology 
shock by an unexpected negative technology shock  ν 1 = −0.036. The results are 
displayed in Figure 3. At time 1, technology decreases, but the real wage decreases 
only partially because of wage rigidity. Relative to technology, the marginal cost 
of labor increases. In response, firms post fewer vacancies. Thus, labor market 
tightness, private employment, and GDP fall whereas unemployment increases. 
Qualitatively, an increase in public employment has the same effect in expan-
sion and recession; but quantitatively, the effects are different. In the expansion of 
Figure 2, tightness increases by 0.07 from 1.15 to 1.22 after the increase in public 
employment; in the recession of Figure 3, it only increases by 0.02 from 0.14 to 
0.16. Hence, the resulting increase in hiring cost is much larger in expansion than 
in recession. In the expansion, the expected number of vacancies required to hire a 
worker increases by 0.27 from 6.41 to 6.68; in the recession, it only increases by 0.16 
from 1.47 to 1.64. Thus, crowding-out is larger in expansion than in recession. In the 
 expansion, private employment falls by 0.35 percentage points from 80.29 percent 
to 79.94 percent at its extremum; in the recession, it only falls by 0.18 percentage 
points from 77.18 percent to 77.00 percent. To  conclude, increasing public employ-
ment reduces unemployment more effectively in recession than in expansion. In the 
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Figure 3. Responses to a Negative Technology Shock
Notes: The solid lines are the responses to an unexpected negative technology shock of −3.6 percent. The dashed 
lines are the responses to an unexpected negative technology shock of −3.6 percent accompanied by the unexpected 
hiring of 0.5 percent of the labor force in the public sector. The responses are obtained by simulating an approxima-
tion of the calibrated New Keynesian model in which firms and workers have perfect foresight.
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expansion, unemployment only falls by 0.08 percentage points from 4.94 percent to 
4.86 percent at its extremum; in the recession, it falls by 0.24 percentage points from 
8.02 percent to 7.78 percent.
To measure the period-by-period effect of an increase in public employment, 
I compute the instantaneous multiplier at time t. This multiplier is defined as 
( n t * −   nt )/( g t * −   gt ), where   nt and   gt are employment levels before government 
intervention, and  n t ∗ and  g t ∗ are levels after intervention. To isolate the marginal 
effect of an increase in public employment, { n t ∗ } and { g t ∗ } are obtained by hiring 
only 0.01 percent of the labor force in the public sector at time 1. The multiplier 
gives the number of jobs created in period t for each job added to the public sec-
tor in that period. Figure 4A shows the response of the instantaneous multiplier to 
a positive technology shock  ν 1 = +0.054, and Figure 4B shows the response to a 
negative technology shock  ν 1 = −0.036. At time 1, the instantaneous multiplier is 
small in both cases. After the positive shock, the multiplier grows slowly to reach a 
steady-state value of 0.38. The increase of the multiplier concurs with the increase 
in unemployment when unemployment reverts to its steady-state level. After the 
negative shock, the multiplier grows quickly and peaks at 0.58 after 30 weeks. The 
peak of the multiplier broadly concurs with the peak of unemployment. After the 
peak, unemployment and multiplier revert to their steady-state levels.
To summarize the effect of an increase in public employment after a given tech-
nology shock, I compute the cumulative multiplier. This multiplier is defined as
(20)   
 ∑ 
t=0
T
 ( n t * −   nt )
  _
 ∑ 
t=0
T
 ( g t * −   gt )
 ,
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Figure 4. Multiplier Dynamics in Expansion and Recession
Notes: The positive shock is an unexpected increase in technology by +5.4  percent. The negative shock is an unexpected 
decrease in technology by −3.6 percent. The instantaneous multiplier at time t is ( n t * −   nt )/( g t * −   gt ), where   nt and   gt 
are aggregate and public employment without government intervention and  n t ∗ and  g t ∗ are aggregate and public employ-
ment with government intervention. The intervention is the unexpected hiring of 0.01  percent of the labor force in the 
public sector. The multiplier dynamics are obtained by simulating the calibrated New Keynesian model.
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where T = 15,000 is the horizon in the shooting algorithm, long enough for the 
model to converge back to steady state. The multiplier measures the total number of 
job × weeks created by hiring workers in the public sector divided by the number of 
job × weeks added to the public sector. This multiplier accounts for the persistence 
of public employment, arising because public workers cannot be dismissed such that 
public jobs are closed only at a rate s. I repeat the simulations described in Figure 4 
for a collection of 16 technology shocks ranging from  ν 1 = −0.036 to  ν 1 = +0.054. 
For each technology shock, I compute the cumulative multiplier given by (20), and 
I measure the extremum of the unemployment response without government inter-
vention. I link each cumulative multiplier to the associated unemployment rate and 
plot the 16 multiplier-unemployment pairs in Figure 5A. The cumulative multiplier 
is countercyclical. It doubles from 0.24 to 0.49 when unemployment increases from 
5 percent to 8 percent. The interpretation is that hiring 1 percent of the labor force in 
the public sector reduces unemployment by 0.49 percentage points in recession and 
by only 0.24 percentage points in expansion.19
The multiplier in Figure 5A has not been estimated empirically. To facilitate com-
parison with empirical evidence, Figure 5B displays another cumulative multiplier 
that measures the percentage point reduction in unemployment obtained by spending 
1 percent of GDP on public employment. This multiplier is given by an  expression 
19 During the Great Depression, the Roosevelt administration was concerned that the public jobs created by the 
New Deal might take away job applicants from firms, thus making it difficult to hire workers in the private sector 
(Neumann, Fishback, and Kantor 2010). The numerical results address this concern by showing that crowding-out of 
private employment is weak in recession.
Figure 5. Cumulative Multipliers over the Business Cycle
Notes: The multipliers in panel A are given by (20). They give the percentage-point increase in aggregate employ-
ment obtained by hiring 1 percent of the labor force in the public sector. The multipliers in panel B are defined in 
the text. They give the percentage-point increase in aggregate employment obtained by spending 1 percent of GDP 
on public employment. Each multiplier is computed by hiring 0.01 percent of the labor force in the public sector in 
response to 1 of 16 technology shocks ranging from −3.6 percent to +5.4 percent. The unemployment rate on the 
x-axis is the extremum of the unemployment response after the technology shock, without government intervention. 
The cumulative multipliers are obtained by simulating the calibrated New Keynesian model.
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that differs from (20) on two counts. First, public employment  g t is replaced by its 
cost,   g t ·  w t + [ g t − (1 − s) ·  g t−1 ] · r ·  a t /q( θ t ). Second, the expression is multi-
plied by steady-state GDP,  
_ y +  _ w ·  _ g + s ·  _ g · r/q( _ θ), to measure the cost of public 
employment as a fraction of GDP. This alternative multiplier is also countercycli-
cal; it increases from 0.34 to 0.71 when unemployment increases from 5 percent to 
8 percent. The interpretation is that spending 1 percent of GDP on public employ-
ment reduces unemployment by 0.71 percentage points in recession and by only 
0.34 percentage points in expansion. Unemployment averaged 5.8 percent in the 
United States from 1954 to 2006; at that rate, the multiplier is 0.45. This value is 
aligned with the results of Monacelli, Perotti, and Trigari (2010). Using US data for 
the 1954–2006 period, they estimate a structural vector autoregression and compute 
a cumulative multiplier defined as that in Figure 5B. At a two-year horizon, they find 
a multiplier of 0.43.20
The level and cyclicality of the multipliers are robust to changes in public-
employment policy. Appendix B describes the multipliers obtained when public 
employment is a constant fraction of private employment in absence of government 
intervention: for all t ≥ 0,   gt = ζ ·   l t , where ζ =  _ g / _ l = 0.20 is the steady-state 
ratio of public employment to private employment. The results are almost identical 
to those displayed in Figure 5.21
III. Conclusion
In this paper, I have developed a theory in which the public employment mul-
tiplier varies across stages of the business cycle. My analysis has two important 
implications for work that estimates government multipliers. A first implication is 
that work that estimates average multipliers over all stages of the business cycle may 
not be informative for the design of government policy in recessions.22 The reason 
is that multipliers may be very different in recessions, compared to other stages 
of the business cycle. For instance, in this model, the public employment multi-
plier is much higher in recessions. In Figure 5B, the multiplier is 0.45 at a normal 
unemployment rate of 5.8 percent, but it reaches 0.71 when the unemployment rate 
reaches 8 percent.
Estimating multipliers that account for the stage of the business cycle in which 
the government increases spending is therefore essential for policy applications. 
Two studies offer a promising start on this agenda. Both find countercyclical mul-
tipliers.23 Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2011) use a direct projection method that 
allows the multiplier to vary smoothly with the stage of the business cycle. In data 
for a large number of OECD countries, they find that the multiplier is quite large in 
20 See table 1, column 4 in Monacelli, Perotti, and Trigari (2010).
21 The level and cyclicality of the multipliers are also robust to changes in monetary policy. I redid the simu-
lations with a monetary policy rule that includes an output gap:  r t = (1/β) · (1 +  π t )  μ π  · ( u t / _ u )  μ  u  , where  _ u is 
steady-state unemployment,  μ π = 5, and  μ u = −0.8. The values of  μ π and  μ u are borrowed from Blanchard and 
Galí (2010). The results were almost identical to those displayed in Figure 5.
22 Parker (2011) made this point, and this paper offers a theoretical support for his argument.
23 Other researchers who estimate such multipliers include Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012), Canova and 
Pappa (2011), Bachmann and Sims (2012), and Holden and Sparrman (2011).
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recessions but not significantly different from zero in expansions.24 Nakamura and 
Steinsson (2011)measure how an increase in government consumption in a given 
US state during a military build-up affects employment in this state.25 Their estimate 
of the multiplier is much larger when unemployment is high than when unemploy-
ment is low.26
A second implication is that work that estimates average multipliers over all types 
of government spending may not be useful to assess the effectiveness of specific 
types of spending. The reason is that multipliers may be very different for differ-
ent types of spending. For instance, in this model increasing public employment 
reduces unemployment, but increasing government purchases of goods from the pri-
vate sector has no effect on unemployment.27 Hence, estimating separate multipliers 
by types of government spending is essential for policy applications.28
Several restrictions limit the degree to which the theory moves us toward a com-
plete understanding of the role for government spending over the business cycle. A 
first restriction is that in the model, public sector jobs are identical to private sec-
tor jobs. But in practice, these jobs may differ. A first difference concerns wages. 
During the New Deal, hourly wages were substantially lower in relief jobs than in 
private jobs (Neumann, Fishback, and Kantor 2010) and, on average, public sector 
wages are higher and more rigid than private sector wages. A second difference con-
cerns separation rates. In the United States, public sector jobs last much longer than 
private sector jobs because the separation rate in the private sector is almost three 
times higher than in the public sector. If jobs differ across sectors, job seekers will 
direct their search toward a specific sector. Studying the effect of public employ-
ment in this context may be difficult, but it would offer a more accurate characteriza-
tion of the cyclical behavior of the public employment multiplier.
A second restriction is that in the model, firms are always able to sell their entire 
production at the going price, such that the concept of deficient aggregate demand 
is absent. This assumption explains why government purchases of goods from the 
private sector have no effect on unemployment. This assumption is unrealistic, and it 
is important to relax it to analyze the effect of government purchases on unemploy-
ment. Michaillat and Saez (2013) take a first step in this direction. They propose a 
new kind of business cycle model with trade frictions in both labor market and prod-
uct market. Unemployment and unsold production arise in equilibrium. Recessions 
may be caused by technology shocks or aggregate demand shocks. They study how 
24 The results are reported in panel B of Table 3 in Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2011). Column 1 and 2 show 
that the multiplier is 0.50 (standard deviation: 0.22) in recessions and −0.11 (standard deviation: 0.15) in expan-
sions. A recession is defined as a period when the detrended unemployment rate is especially high, and an expansion 
as a period when the detrended unemployment rate is especially low.
25 The effect of government consumption is isolated from a monetary policy response because US states are part 
of a monetary union.
26 Column 3 in table IV in Nakamura and Steinsson (2011) shows that the multiplier is 1.85 when the US unem-
ployment rate is above the median and 1.10 when the US unemployment rate is below the median. The estimates 
are not very precise because the number of business cycles in the sample is limited.
27 Consider the simple model of Section I. Suppose that the government purchases G units of final good from 
the private sector. G only appears in the resource constraint: y = c + G + s · n · r/q(θ). In particular, G affects 
neither quasi-labor supply nor aggregate labor demand. Hence, G has no effect on unemployment. However, G 
crowds out one-for-one the household’s consumption of final good, c.
28 Some researchers who have done so include Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) and Pappa (2010).
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 consumption and unemployment respond when the government purchases goods 
from the private sector.
Appendix A: Proofs
PROOF OF LEMMA 3:
Since g/l = ζ in equilibrium, the equilibrium condition for a steady state param-
eterized by w can be written as  n d (θ, w) =  n s (θ), where
(A1)  n d (θ, w) = (1 + ζ) ·  [ 1 _ α ·  { w + [1 − β · (1 − s)] ·  r _ q(θ)  } ]  −1 _ 1 − α  .
Implicit differentiation of the equilibrium condition yields
  dθ _ 
dw
  =  ∂ n d  _∂w   ·  
∂ n s  _∂θ   −  
∂ n d  _∂θ  
 −1
" " " .− + −
The signs of the derivatives come from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, which also applies 
to the aggregate labor demand defined by (A1). Thus, dθ/dw < 0. The other results 
follow since n =  n s (θ), u = 1 − (1 − s) · n, and l = n/(1 + ζ).
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1:
I first prove parts (i) and (ii). Implicit differentiation of equation (6) yields
(A2)   ∂ n d  _∂θ  ·  
dθ _
dg
 = −  1 _ 
1 + ( ϵ  s / ϵ  d ) ,
where  ϵ  s ≡ (θ/ n s ) · (∂ n s /∂θ) > 0,  ϵ  d ≡ −(θ/ n d ) · (∂ n d /∂θ) > 0. Next, implicit 
differentiation of equation (7) yields
   dn _
dg
 = 1 +  ∂ n d  _∂θ  ·  
dθ _
dg
 .
Combining this result with (A2) yields an expression for the public employment 
multiplier:
(A3)  λ ≡  dn _
dg
 = 1 −  1 _ 
1 + ( ϵ  s / ϵ  d ) ,
Since  ϵ  s ∈ (0, +∞) and  ϵ  d ∈ (0, +∞), then λ ∈ (0, 1).
Next, I prove part (iii). The first step is to express  ϵ  s and  ϵ  d as functions of endog-
enous variables. The definition of  n s (θ) implies
(A4)   ϵ  s = (1 − η) · u.
VoL. 6 No. 1 215Michaillat: a theory of countercyclical GovernMent Multiplier
The definition of  l  d (θ, w) implies (θ/l) · (∂ l  d /∂θ) = −[η/(1 − α)] · Ω, where
  Ω ≡  [1 − β · (1 − s)] · r/q(θ)   ___    [1 − β · (1 − s)] · r/q(θ) + w .
Since  n d (θ, w, g) = g +  l d (θ, w) and n/l = 1 + ζ in equilibrium, I can relate  ϵ  d to Ω:
(A5)   ϵ d = −  1 _ 
1 + ζ ·  
θ _ 
l
 ·  ∂ l d  _∂θ  =  
η __ (1 + ζ) · (1 − α) · Ω .
Lemma 3 and the fact that q is decreasing imply dΩ/dw < 0. Hence, (A5) implies 
d ϵ d /dw < 0. Lemma 3 and equation (A4) imply d ϵ s /dw > 0. Thus, (A3) implies 
dλ/dw > 0.
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